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Abstract
In this paper we investigate how “civil service” personnel management inter-
acts with bureaucratic discretion to create high capacity, expert bureaucracies pop-
ulated by policy-motivated agents. We build a model in which bureaucrats may
invest in (relationship speciﬁc) policy expertise, and may be either policy-motivated
or policy-indiﬀerent. We show that under speciﬁc conditions on the nature of ex-
pertise and bureaucratic discretion over policy choices, merit system protections for
job tenure encourage the development of expertise and problem solving capacity
in the bureaucracy. In addition, we identify conditions under which typical civil
service rules encourage policy-motivated bureaucrats to enter and remain in public
service, and policy-indiﬀerent bureaucrats to leave it.
1 Introduction
Civil service restrictions on public personnel management – on selection of employees,
job assignment and reassignment, pay equality within job grades, and especially near
guarantees of lifetime job tenure – are commonly lamented as a major source of public
sector ineﬃciency, an outdated system created in response (or even overreaction) to a
problem that no longer exists. Indeed, major provisions of the merit system in place in the
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1U.S. and many industrialized nations, as well as states and municipal governments in the
U.S., do seem to weaken public sector employees’ extrinsic incentives to be responsive
and energetic in pursuing their duties. But many civil service provisions now have a
sizable supporting constituency with a major, concentrated interest in their maintenance.
Even “major” reform eﬀorts, such as the federal Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, are
variations around the theme, and in some ways add yet more restrictions on public
personnel management. The debate over whether 170,000 (by White House estimates)
federal employees moved into the Department of Homeland Security in 2002 would be
subject to civil service protection only underscores that the coverage of a much larger
portion of the federal workforce is beyond debate. In some form, civil service seems to
be here to stay.
Most previous discussions of civil service and merit selection, as far as the quality
of public employees goes, have focused only selection of public employees with desirable
exogenous traits. And, as the name “merit selection” implies, one hopes that selecting on
the basis of exams rather than party service or political loyalty makes for a better crop
of employees. Indeed, we do not want to take issue with that as far as it goes – only to
recognize that it is incomplete. The reason is that selection of people with high intrinsic
ability, whatever that might mean, is only part of the story. New hires, even meritorious
ones, do not immediately step into high level analysis or management positions. They
must take time to learn the job and to learn the policy area and to learn the complex
of government responses to it. They must, in short, develop their skill. High merit
employees may have an easier time doing that, or may get more out of any given time
spent in skill development, but the point is that these skills must be acquired: they are
not simply imparted by osmosis to whatever employees happen to be hanging around.
And to acquire them implies active eﬀort on the part of the employee. In other words,
potential employees may start out with diﬀerent talents, and merit selection may help
select better ones, but that is the start and not the end of the personnel problem. Expert
bureaucrats are made, through their own endogenous eﬀort, not born. Put diﬀerently,
one of our underlying points is that in the counter-factual world where the bureaucrats
that would be selected in a “merit system” without job tenure could have somehow
been selected in a patronage system, the bureaucracy still would not have developed the
capacity and expertise that characterize it today.
This paper is an analysis of how civil service rules aﬀect that endogenous eﬀort for
skill development, by altering incentives employees face for exerting it. Since employees
2evidently do not start out with all the skills they need to truly expand bureaucratic
capacity and expertise, this is an essential, but previously missing, piece of the puzzle
over the incentive eﬀects of civil service.
Even granting the widely claimed incentive problems of a civil service system with job
tenure for careerists, we show that, in the right political context, it has notable upsides
as well in terms of motivation and management of bureaucratic agencies. Civil service
based on merit protection helps to solve important problems of employee selection and
motivation. But the eﬀectiveness, and the eﬀects, of this approach to personnel manage-
ment are contingent on both the types of policy problems with which the government
reckons, and on the wider political environment, in important and intelligible ways.
Policy expertise in our model is costly for bureaucrats to develop, and is a relationship
speciﬁc investment, in that it is most valuable to the bureaucrat provided her employment
in public service persists. In our model, mastery of the ﬁne points of the policy process,
an agency’s accounting and records system, and substantive policy details is much less
valuable in alternative employment than it is in public service. Because expertise is
both costly and relationship speciﬁc, early investments in it create a possible “hold
up” problem for the bureaucrat: if the investment is made, but the relationship does
not continue, the bureaucrat may not reap gains exceeding the cost of investment.1
Therefore, uncertainty about future job tenure (say because of spoils system practices)
implies uncertainty about a future stream of beneﬁts ﬂowing from this investment, and
bureaucrats may avoid investing in expertise as a result. “Standard” ownership solutions
allowing the investing agent somehow to appropriate the value of the stream of beneﬁts
at the time of investment are not generally available in public bureaucracy, but it is
possible to ensure that with very high probability the agent will be around to reap
beneﬁts (whatever they might be) as they trickle in, by making it very diﬃcult to remove
employees. Merit system protection of job tenure, then, removes some of the downside
risk that bureaucrats face when developing their expertise.
However, this alone is not enough to induce bureaucrats to develop expertise individu-
ally, or bureaucracies to develop problem solving capacity collectively. Bureaucrats in our
model can be one of two “types”: policy-motivated or policy-indiﬀerent. Simply put, in
our model some people care about public policy per se, while others do not. The relative
proportions of these types in the population is a parameter of the model. Furthermore,
1The hold up problem has been discussed by many economists and political scientists. Recent exam-
ples of work in this area include Castaneda [2004] and Lau [2003].
3this relative proportion aﬀects the legislature’s optimal civil service contract. One of the
main points of the paper is that, in the presence of job tenure protection, bureaucrats
who do not care about policy (“slackers”) cannot be motivated to develop expertise;
they simply value material rewards and not the policy utility that comes from developing
expertise. While policy-motivated bureaucrats (“zealots”) do care about policy, in order
for these bureaucrats to beneﬁt directly from developing expertise, they must be able to
earn some policy rent in order to wish to develop it in equilibrium. If, on the contrary,
policy-motivated bureaucrats are not able to capture enough rent from bending policy
to their liking, investing in expertise will not be worthwhile.
We show that a civil service contract that oﬀers the policy rents necessary to induce
expertise acquisition by the zealots can, in certain situations, be oﬀered by the legislature.
In particular, such a contract oﬀers a bureaucrat who acquires expertise more discretion to
shape policy in the future. Furthermore, we show that it is easier to design such a contract
when bureaucrats are secure (e.g., protected by some version of job tenure) in their
civil service employment. However, without the provision of enough expertise-dependent
discretion throughout the relationship, even a policy-motivated bureaucrat with secure
job tenure may face a second “hold up” problem. Namely, if the agent acquires expertise
only to have a political principal direct its use away from the bureaucrat’s desires, the
bureaucrat’s gains from expertise acquisition may no longer justify the individual cost of
acquisition.
In general, this paper makes the general point that bureaucratic discretion, as dic-
tated by political imperatives faced by the bureaucracy’s political “principals,” interacts
with civil service rules in an important way to generate incentives for bureaucrats to
invest in expertise. Both of these conditions of the bureaucratic system are important
in overcoming the holdup problem, one to reduce the downside risk of sinking the re-
lationship speciﬁc investment, and one to enhance the upside beneﬁt. Moreover, some
of the necessary discretion can be created by a structural mismatch between the over-
sight capabilities of political authorities and the vast size of the bureaucracy. Simply, if
the bureaucracy is too ponderous to be eﬀectively controlled in its entirety by political
principals, this creates some irreducible bureaucratic discretion over policy choices, and
therefore generates incentives for policy-motivated bureaucrats to develop policy exper-
tise. Ironically, the imperfect control of the federal bureaucracy interacts with the job
security guaranteed by civil service to create a useful incentive to develop the policy
making capacity that is essential for the policy process as it exists today.
4This solution to the holdup problem has another beneﬁt as well, from a political
principal’s point of view: it only works for the policy motivated types of agent. Thus in
addition to motivating the development of expertise, the civil service rules we examine
induce policy motivated types – who are ﬁnancially cheaper to retain in public service –
to dominate the ranks of civil servants. Given stable job tenure, bureaucratic discretion
is both an action- and type-contingent reward for investment in expertise.
For its part, the political principal’s (legislature’s, in our model) challenge is to oﬀer
the bureaucrats just enough control over policy, but no more than necessary, to induce
them to develop expertise and select into public service based on policy utility. After
all, any agent whose utility is sensitive enough to policy outcomes can obviously be
induced to educate herself fully on technical minutiae of a policy area by making her the
area-speciﬁc dictator for a year: this is as close as possible to creating a residual claim
on policy expertise. Of course this is unattractive from the system designer’s point of
view because it gives more control than necessary – it places too high a premium on
informational gains, and too low a premium on distributive beneﬁts.
In short, this seemingly ossiﬁed, obsolete personnel management system can have
crucial eﬀects on the capacity of the bureaucracy – because of incentives for endogenous
actions and because of personnel selection based on exogenous tastes – to carry out policy
formulation and implementation. We discuss our results in terms of civil service reform
in developed countries, and the development of state capacity in developing ones.
This paper contributes to the formal literature on bureaucratic expertise and/or ca-
pacity (e.g., Epstein and O’Halloran [1994, 1999]; Carpenter [2001]; Huber and Shipan
[2002]; Huber and McCarty [2004]) by investigating the underpinnings of expertise. The
large political economy literature on how political authorities can shape the policy choices
of bureaucratic agencies (e.g. McCubbins et al. [1987, 1989]; Calvert et al. [1989]) has
paid much less attention to the selection of personnel for public service, or their incentives
to develop expertise. Horn [1995] treats merit system protections as a way for govern-
ments to solve commitment problems with respect to future governments. In essence,
civil service is a form of policy insulation (cf. Moe [1987]), because bureaucrats with
relatively ﬁxed tastes inﬂuence policy long after their appointing politicians leave oﬃce.
However, this line of reasoning cannot convincingly explain why merit protection would
appear in diﬀerent jurisdictions or states in explainable patterns – e.g., in response to
speciﬁc problems – instead of appearing earlier everywhere. Johnson and Libecap [1994]
argue that merit protection relieved politicians of the problem of monitoring the political
5behavior of patronage appointees, which became acute as the bureaucracy grew. Chang
et al. [2001] empirically analyze the turnover of top political appointees (and show its
relationship to political conﬂict with political principals and relative wages available in
public and private employment), a pool of public servants complementary to the career
civil servants relevant for our analysis.
2 A Model of Civil Service Contracts and Delegation
We model the delegation of authority, hiring of bureaucrats, acquisition of expertise, and
implementation of policy as a non-cooperative game between two players: the legislature
and the bureaucrat. We assume that the game lasts for two periods.2 In each period,
the legislature sets the discretion oﬀered to the bureaucrat with regard to the setting of
policy. We denote the convex policy space by X ⊂ R and the discretion given by the
legislature to the bureaucrat in time period t by Dt ∈ R+. We assume that higher values
of Dt indicate higher levels of bureaucratic discretion in the sense that the bureaucrat
can choose from a strictly large set of policies to implement. (One can think of Dt as
representing the width of an interval of policies centered at zero3 that the bureaucrat can
choose from.) The policy outcome in time t is a function of the implemented policy, xt,
and the state of nature in period t, denoted by ωt. Speciﬁcally, the policy outcome in time
t is yt = xt+ωt. The set of all states of nature is denoted by Ω. We assume that in both
time periods, ωt is independently drawn from Ω according to a cumulative distribution
function on R, denoted by G, with zero mean and ﬁnite variance. The bureaucrat is of
type θ ∈ {0,1}, with θ = 1 denoting that the bureaucrat cares about the policy outcome
per se. The probability that a bureaucrat is of type θ = 1 is denoted by f ∈ [0,1].
For the remainder of the analysis, we assume that the policy space and space of
states of nature are each convex subsets of the real numbers including zero and that the





where δL ∈ [0,1] is a discount factor. Denoting the bureaucrat’s most preferred policy
2While we consider only the 2-period case in this paper, extending the game to more than two periods
is straightforward and, without additional assumptions, oﬀers no additional intuition.
3It is straightforward to show that centering the discretionary window at E(ω) is without loss of
generality as long as B must choose policy within the window. See Epstein and O’Halloran [1999] and
Gailmard [2002].
6outcome by pb > 0, the bureaucrat’s period 1 payoﬀs are given by
u
1
B = r − θ|pb − y
1| − cs,
where r is the remuneration for government employment (treated as an exogenous para-
meter of the model), θ ∈ {0,1} denotes the type of bureaucrat, pb > 0 reﬂects ideological
conﬂict with the legislature, c is the cost of obtaining expertise (also a parameter), and
s ∈ {0,1} denotes whether expertise was obtained (a choice variable for the bureaucrat).
For simplicity, let π(y1) = |pb − y1| denote the bureaucrat’s utility function (thus, we
leave the bureaucrat’s ideal point implicit). Then, given a choice of policy equal to y2 in
the second period, the bureaucrat’s period 2 payoﬀs are given by
u
2
B = r − θ|pb − y
2| = r − θπ(y
2)
if the bureaucrat remains in oﬃce and
u
2
B = w − θ|pb − y
2| = w − θπ(y
2)
if he or she decides to seek outside employment.
We focus on the following sequence of moves:
1. L chooses ﬁrst period discretion D1
2. Nature chooses B’s type θ and reveals it to B.
3. B chooses to invest in expertise (s = 1) or not invest (s = 0).
4. Nature chooses ω.
5. If s = 1, B learns ω; otherwise B retains its prior beliefs about ω.





7. B chooses whether to stay in government in period 2. If so, L chooses second period
discretion as a function of s (D2(s)) and play continues with step 4 ( nature chooses
a new value of ω; if not, then a new bureaucrat takes the job and all steps repeat.
The game form is designed so that the legislature can oﬀer any level of discretion it
wants to a new agent, but can condition this discretion on the bureaucrat’s expertise only
7after the ﬁrst period. This assumption is motivated by our desire to understand expertise
acquisition that occurs “on-the-job.” Furthermore, if the legislature could observe the
relevant expertise prior to the ﬁrst period of the game, then one might expect that no
non-expert bureaucrats would be hired by the legislature in the ﬁrst place. Our model
allows us to understand the dynamics of individuals taking civil service employment and
then sorting themselves with regard to their desire to aﬀect policy and bearing the burden
of developing job-speciﬁc human capital within the bureaucracy.
Utility in the game is simply the sum of utilities from each period, with period 2
utilities discounted by δ. Sequential equilibrium is the appropriate concept to use since
L must choose D without knowing the prior choices of Nature, but we leave oﬀ-path
beliefs unspeciﬁed because they are irrelevant. The expected period t policy payoﬀ for the
bureaucrat, given discretion D and expertise decision s, is denoted by φs(D). Speciﬁcally,
given expertise acquisition s, discretion set by the legislature given s, and policy choice







Ω π(x + ω)G(dω) if s = 0
maxz∈DΩ
R
Ω π(z(ω) + ω)G(dω) if s = 1
.
Clearly, for any discretion D, φ1(D) ≥ φ0(D). For the remainder of the paper, we will
assume that φ1(0) = φ0(0) and that this inequality is strict for all D > 0.4
We will denote the optimal expertise acquisition decision for a bureaucrat of type
θ by s∗
θ. The decision of the legislature regarding discretion in period 1 is denoted by
D1 and the discretion oﬀered by the legislature in period 2, following observation of
expertise acquisition s, is denoted by D2(s). In order to make the analysis interesting
and tractable, we make the following assumptions.
Assumption 1 (Private compensation) w ≥ r. To assume otherwise results in a
model that is uninteresting: every bureaucrat will remain in oﬃce, regardless of his or
her type or the amount of discretion oﬀered by the legislature.
Assumption 2 (Uninformed bureaucrats) In order to assure that the model’s pre-
dictions are not driven by the behavior of otherwise indiﬀerent actors, we assume that
4This assumption rules out pathological cases, all of which are uninteresting. A suﬃcient condition
for this assumption to be satisﬁed is to assume that, for all D > 0, there exist two subsets of Ω, q,r, each
with positive G-measure, such that there exists xr ∈ D and yr ∈ D, xr 6= yr satisfying the following:
ω ∈ q ⇒ π(xq + ω) > π(xr + ω) and ω ∈ r ⇒ π(xr + ω) > π(xq + ω).
8uninformed type-0 bureaucrats choose the same policy as that which would be chosen by
an uninformed type-1 bureaucrat.5
Assumption 3 (Overlapping generations) A newly-hired type-1 bureaucrat will ac-
quire information in the second period if it is in the interests of type-1 bureaucrats to
acquire information in the ﬁrst period. This is equivalent to an “overlapping genera-
tions” assumption.
Assumption 4 (Policy sensitivity) The type-1 bureaucrat cares about policy, but not
enough in any single period to acquire expertise for that purpose alone, i.e. (taking as
given that D(1) > D(0), as will be shown below),
0 < φ
1(D(1)) − φ
0(D(0)) < c. (1)
3 Partial Equilibrium Analysis
In this section, we present a partial equilibrium analysis of civil service design. This
analysis is motivated by the supposition that organizational design and change by demo-
cratic governments is somewhat “sticky.” In the following section, we present an analysis
of the responses of the equilibrium civil service contracts to changes in the parameters
of the model. The analysis in the following section is more appropriate when considering
long-term tendencies of civil service design or situations with both high ﬂuidity of design
and rational foresight on the part of the individuals involved.6 This section, on the other
hand, is more suitable for studying the responses of potential bureaucrats to a preexisting
and ﬁxed system of civil service employment.
After deriving the incentives and optimal behaviors of potential civil servants, the ul-
timate goal of this section is to characterize the equilibrium civil service contracts. First,
we need to represent the legislature’s contract as a strategy. Given that the bureaucrat’s
choice of expertise, s, is observed once and is binary, the legislature’s strategy is denoted
by a triple, (D1,D2(0),D2(1)). The ﬁrst component of the strategy is the discretionary
authority oﬀered to a new bureaucrat. The second component is the discretionary au-
thority given to a bureaucrat who chooses to stay in the civil service after choosing not
5One might think of this as an assumption of benevolence or altruism. If we altered this assumption,
type-1 bureaucrats would have an increased incentive to remain in oﬃce in the second period.
6We thank Marcus Berliant for many helpful suggestions regarding this and the next section.
9to acquire expertise (s = 0). The ﬁnal component of the legislature’s strategy is the
discretion given to a bureaucrat who acquired expertise in the previous period (s = 1).
We also assume that D1 = D2(0) ≤ D2(1) (i.e., the legislature oﬀers the same discretion
to all non-expert bureaucrats, regardless of how long they have been employed in the
civil service)7 and, for simplicity, denote D2(1) simply by D2.8
3.1 Optimal Policy Choice and Discretion
Some initial results are straightforward and well known from previous work (especially
Epstein and O’Halloran [1994, 1999]). B chooses policy xt to solve maxx∈Dt −θE(|pb −
yt|). For θ = 1 and Dt > 0 this results in equilibrium policy x∗t in the interior of the
discretionary region if the latter contains B’s expected ideal policy, and at the boundary
of the region otherwise. Note that an informed θ = 0 type is happy to pursue L’s interests
and achieves the progressive-era ideal of “neutral competence,” but as we will see the
inducements available cannot cause such a type to invest in expertise.
The legislature chooses D2 to maximize its expected period 2 utility (with respect to
G(ω)) given B’s best response x∗t. Familiar results imply that D2(s) = 0 if s = 0 and the
bureaucrat has remained in oﬃce,9 since uninformed bureaucrats are no better at setting
x = −EG(ω) than L is, and that Dt is strictly decreasing (over the relevant range) in pb.
None of these results depend on the two period structure; they are repetitions of results
from one period models.
3.2 Self-Selection of Bureaucrats
For a bureaucrat of type θ = 0, the payoﬀ of remaining in oﬃce in the second period
is simple to compute: it is equal to r. The payoﬀ from taking private employment is
w. The assumption that w > r (assumption 1) implies that type-0 bureaucrats will
7In addition to empirical realism, this restriction turns out to be justiﬁed on “equilibrium behavior”
grounds as well, as we discuss below.
8In the next section, we denote an equilibrium contract, given a vector of parameters λ, by
D∗ = (D1(λ),D2(0|λ),D2(1|λ)). In this section, however, our ﬁrst concern is simply the incentives
and behavior of civil servants facing some arbitrary contract D = (D1,D2(0),D2(1)).
9I.e., this result applies to the path of play – oﬀ the equilibrium path as we emphasize below – where
the bureaucrat chooses s = 0 and remains in public service in period 2, so L is certain that the sitting
bureaucrat does not have expertise. On the equilibrium path, assumption 3 implies that L may not be
certain that s = 0 since a new bureaucrat will be in oﬃce in period 2. To make a long story short, the
fact that D2(0) = 0 oﬀ the equilibrium path and our earlier assumption that D1 = D2(0) on the path
do not imply that D1 = 0 on the path.
10leave in the second period. Such bureaucrats will obviously not acquire expertise in the
ﬁrst period.10 Using assumptions 2 and 3 (the uninformed bureaucrats and overlapping
generations assumptions), the expected payoﬀ for a type-1 bureaucrat who decides to
leave oﬃce in the second period is equal to
w + fφ
1(D1) + (1 − f)φ
0(D1)
if the optimal expertise acquisition decision for type 1 bureaucrats in the ﬁrst period is
1 (i.e. s∗
1 = 1) and
w + φ
0(D1)
otherwise. Given our assumption that w > r and since D1 = D2(0), it follows imme-
diately that no bureaucrats of either type will remain in oﬃce in the second period if
s∗
1 = 0.
We also want to examine cases in which the type-1 bureaucrat remains in oﬃce after
acquiring expertise. This is the case if
r + φ
1(D2(1)) ≥ w + fφ
1(D1) + (1 − f)φ
0(D1). (2)
(We assume throughout that a bureaucrat who is indiﬀerent between taking outside
employment and remaining in oﬃce chooses to remain in oﬃce.) Combining Equation 2
with the inequality in assumption 4 (policy sensitivity) yields the following proposition.11
Proposition 1 Type-1 bureaucrats (zealots) who acquired expertise (s = 1) will choose
10This might change if w is a function of s. Inclusion of this possibility is left for future work, as it will
not aﬀect this model in a substantively interesting way. To see this, note that type-0 bureaucrats will only
acquire expertise for monetary reasons. Thus, the legislature in this setting can not appropriate their
expertise in future periods by oﬀering them additional discretion in return for expertise acquisition. It
might, however, increase the size of the “discretion rent” the legislature has to oﬀer to type-1 bureaucrats
in order to retain their services after expertise acquisition. This presumes that w(1) > w(0). If w(1) <
w(0) (i.e., expertise acquisition lowers the value of one’s outside option, it is relatively straightforward
to show that the analysis presented in this paper would remain unchanged, as the bureaucrats who leave
the civil service are not acquiring expertise anyway in equilibrium.
11The condition in proposition 1 (Equation 3) is actually stronger than necessary. It follows by
reexpressing Equation 2 as
r + φ1(D2(1)) ≥ w + φ0(D1) + f(φ1(D1) − φ0(D1))
and replacing φ1(D1) − φ0(D1) with c, according to assumption 4.
11to remain in oﬃce if
φ
1(D2(1)) − φ
0(D1) ≥ w − r + fc. (3)
Proposition 1 allows us to deduce some interesting partial equilibrium comparative sta-
tics. To do so, suppose for simplicity (and for the moment) that at the beginning of
period 2 the bureaucrat (denoted by i) observes a private sector wage, ˜ wi, drawn from




0(D1) ≥ ˜ wi − r + fc.
This temporary statistical addendum to the model makes the statement of comparative
statics in the next proposition less awkward, as it allows us to talk about the probability of
retaining an expert bureaucrat in the civil service as a function of four of the parameters
of the model (w,r,f, and c).
Proposition 2 Suppose that the civil service contract D = (D1,D2(0),D2(1))) is ﬁxed,
with D1 < D2(1) and D2(0) < D2(1) ()i.e., expert bureaucrats receive the most discretion
under D), and the bureaucrat observes a private sector wage ˜ wi at the beginning of the
second period, as described above. Then, the probability that a bureaucrat who acquired
expertise will remain in the civil service is decreasing in each of the following:
1. the probability of type-1 bureaucrats (i.e., zealots), f,
2. the cost of acquiring expertise, c, and
3. the diﬀerence between the private sector and government wages, w − r.
In our opinion, these comparative statics are important because of their analogues in
the real world of civil service design. Before discussing them, however, it is important
to remember that these comparative statics are derived in “partial equilibrium” – they
require that the civil service contract oﬀered by the legislature not vary as a result of
changes in the parameters of the model. With that caveat out of the way, consider the
ﬁrst conclusion of Proposition 2. Bureaucrats with expertise have less of an incentive
to stay in the civil service when future bureaucrats are more likely to care about policy,
because today’s bureaucrat realizes that he or she can choose not to stay in the civil
service and still obtain the policy beneﬁts of an expert bureaucrat in the future. The
second and third conclusions of Proposition 2 are no less important empirically (especially
when comparing across agencies and civil service tasks), but the intuition behind both is
12obvious. If the cost of acquiring expertise increases, then the incentive for a bureaucrat
to do so is directly reduced, ceteris paribus. Similarly, if the opportunity cost of staying
in the civil service increases, then the incentive to do so is reduced as well.
In addition to the comparative statics of job retention, the suﬃcient condition stated
in Proposition 1 is of interest because the policy-motivated bureaucrat must take into
account his or her future employment decision (i.e., whether to remain in the civil service
or leave for the private sector) when making a decision in the present about whether to
acquire job-speciﬁc expertise. This decision is the focus of the next section.
3.3 Expertise Acquisition
Bureaucrats will acquire expertise if they expect to garner net beneﬁts from this acquisi-
tion. Such beneﬁts can come in several forms: we examine only the policy beneﬁts that
might be oﬀered by the legislature as a result of becoming an expert bureaucrat. We
explicitly rule out the possibility of monetary rewards as a motivating force behind the
acquisition of on-the-job expertise by civil servants. This is not because such incentives
are not used in real world civil services but, rather, because the use of such incentives
is well-understood theoretically and does not oﬀer the additional self-selection beneﬁts
provided by the use of increased discretionary authority as an incentive.
Considering a legislative strategy (D1,D2(0),D2(1)), the incentive for a type-1 bu-
reaucrat to acquire expertise is based on the following comparison: he or she should








It follows from φ0(D) ≤ φ1(D) for all D and D2(0) = D1 that this reduces to
φ
1(D1) − c + δ[r + φ
1(D2(1))] ≥ φ
0(D1) + δ[w + fφ
1(D1) + (1 − f)φ
0(D1)]. (4)
In other words, since we have assumed that r < w, given that all other newly-hired
type-1 bureaucrats acquire expertise, a type-1 bureaucrat who did not acquire expertise
in the ﬁrst period will seek outside employment. Continuing, Equation 4 holds if
φ
1(D1) − φ
0(D1) + δ[r − w + φ
1(D2(1)) − fφ
1(D1) − (1 − f)φ
0(D1)] ≥ c. (5)
13Equation 5 allows us to make a prediction regarding the eﬀect of job tenure protections
(represented by δ) on the maximum cost that a type-1 bureaucrat is willing to incur
to acquire expertise. Denoting by c(δ) the “cutoﬀ cost” of expertise acquisition, below
which type-1 bureaucrats invests and above which they do not, the following claim is
immediate and set oﬀ for emphasis.
Proposition 3 Holding the contract oﬀered by the legislature constant, the maximum
cost that a zealot bureaucrat is willing to incur to acquire expertise, c(δ), is
1. increasing in his or her valuation of future payoﬀs:
∂c(δ)
∂δ > 0), and
2. nonnegative: c(δ) ≥ 0 for all δ.
Proposition 3 implies that ex ante, the policy-oriented legislature wants the horizon of the
relationship (as captured by the bureaucrat’s discount factor, δ) to be as long as possible.
This is because the relative appeal of increased discretionary authority in the future is
directly proportional to the likelihood that the agent will continue to be employed in
the civil service. Furthermore, while (from an ex post perspective) the legislature only
wants to retain expert bureaucrats, the equilibrium behavior of the bureaucrats is such
that only bureaucrats who have acquired expertise will choose to remain on the job.
Intriguingly, then, it follows that with regard to the legislature’s induced preferences
over δ, the legislature can treat every new bureaucrat as if they will acquire expertise.
Analogously, in terms of inducing expertise acquisition, the legislature is also better
oﬀ with agents who are more sensitive to the ﬁnal policy outcome – even though they
create ideological conﬂict by assumption – because it is easier to induce them to invest.
Ideally, the legislature would like to hire bureaucrats whose policy preferences mirror its
own in terms of ideal policies and are incredibly sensitive to the realization of the ﬁnal
policy outcome. Viewed another way, increasing the bureaucrat’s sensitivity to policy
outcomes in analogous to decreasing the cost of acquiring expertise, c.12
12Though not the focus of our analysis, a form of the ally principle (Bendor and Meirowitz [2004]),
which states that the principal’s (e.g., the legislature’s) preference over agents is an increasing function
of the principal’s preference over the agents’ ideal policies, does hold in our model. However, this is at
least partly due to the fact that the legislature is not involved in the actual setting of policy. Allowing
for this possibility can lead to violations of the ally principle (for example, see Boehmke et al. [2004]).
Though this extension is left for future work, we are intrigued by the implications of this extension for
the design of civil service contracts.
143.4 The Legislature’s Choice of Civil Service Contract
For any discretion level D, let










We assume for simplicity that, for each level of discretion D, both ˆ zD and zD(·) are






Ω |ˆ zD + ω|G(dω) if s = 0
−
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Ω |zD(ω) + ω|G(dω) if s = 1
.
The legislature’s payoﬀ function can now be written as a function of D1 and D2. Pre-
suming that type-1 bureaucrats acquire expertise (i.e., s∗
1 = 1) and remain in oﬃce in
the second period, the legislature’s expected payoﬀ is
uL(D1,D2) = (1 + δ(1 − f))[fγ
1(D1) + (1 − f)γ
0(D1)] + δf[γ
1(D2)].
On the other hand, if type-1 bureaucrats choose not to acquire expertise (i.e., s∗
1 = 0)
and then take a job in the private sector in the second period, the legislature’s expected
payoﬀ is
uL(D1,D2) = (1 + δ)γ
0(D1).
Deﬁne the following values:
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As deﬁned in 6, ˆ D1 is the optimal level of discretion conditional on no bureaucrats
acquiring expertise. The value of ˆ D2
1, as deﬁned in 7, is the optimal level of ﬁrst period
discretion conditional on type-1 bureaucrats (and only type-1 bureaucrats) acquiring
13We could alternatively allow for a multiplicity of optimal policies for the bureaucrat and then simply
choose from that set.
15expertise. Finally, ˆ D2
2 is the optimal level of discretion conditional on all bureaucrats
acquiring expertise. (This is the optimal level of discretion in the second period for bu-
reaucrats who acquired expertise in the ﬁrst period.) The next proposition characterizes
the equilibrium civil service contract in the sense of the contract that maximizes the leg-
islature’s payoﬀ, conditional on sequential rationality by the bureaucrat and legislature.
Proposition 4 The legislature’s optimal civil service contract is (D1,D2(0),D2(1)) is
given by:
1. ( ˆ D1, ˆ D1, ˆ D1) if
(1 + δ)γ
0( ˆ D
1) > (1 + δ(1 − f))[fγ
1( ˆ D
2
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1( ˆ D
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1) − (1 − f)φ
0( ˆ D
2
1)] ≥ c (10)
all simultaneously hold.
3. ( ˜ D1, ˜ D1, ˜ D2) (as deﬁned in the appendix) otherwise.
In words, there are three broad classes of equilibria. The ﬁrst type of equilibrium,
( ˆ D1, ˆ D1, ˆ D1), involves the legislature oﬀering the bureaucrat no incentive (at least in
terms of discretion) to acquire expertise. This equilibrium may occur for a variety of
reasons, but the basic intuition is that the legislature does not gain enough from an expert
bureaucrat to justify the cost of making the acquisition of expertise incentive-compatible.
Broadly, there are two potential sources of these costs: (1) policy drift associated with
the informed implementation of policy by an agent with preferences that diﬀer from the
legislature’s and (2) the direct cost of developing speciﬁc, discretion-limiting legislation
to provide the incentive for type-1 bureaucrats to acquire expertise in the ﬁrst period.
16The second class of equilibrium is the most interesting. In this type of equilibrium,
the legislature oﬀers a contract in which all (and only) the policy-motivated bureaucrats
develop expertise in the ﬁrst period and voluntarily remain in oﬃce in the second pe-
riod. The choice by the legislature to oﬀer discretionary authority to expert bureaucrats
provides the incentive for the type-1 bureaucrats to acquire expertise in the ﬁrst period.
In addition, the use of increased discretionary authority as the “carrot” leads to only
the policy-motivated (i.e., type-1) bureaucrats acquiring the expertise. Notice that this
would not be the case if the carrot were universally appealing (e.g., if bureaucrat’s job
security or wage level depended upon the acquisition of expertise). The legislature oﬀers
the same contract in the second period following no expertise acquisition as it did in the
ﬁrst period because, in equilibrium, the bureaucrat employed in the second period will be
a new employee – the conditions for this type of equilibrium imply that all employees who
remain in the civil service into the second period acquired expertise in the ﬁrst period.
Thus, as mentioned in a footnote above, our restriction on the type of contracts that the
legislature may oﬀer (in particular, that D2(0) = D1) is not binding.
The third type of equilibrium is slightly complicated – put succinctly, the legislature
may not be able to implement its “ideal” contract and still provide an incentive for the
type-1 bureaucrats to acquire expertise. Thus, as outlined in the appendix, the legislature
may have to choose its “constrained ideal” contract from the set of all expertise-discretion
contracts under which expertise acquisition by the type-1 bureaucrats is incentive com-
patible. These contracts are diﬃcult to characterize without a more fully speciﬁed model.
Nevertheless, they will be similar in nature to the two types of equilibria described above.
4 Equilibrium Comparative Statics
In this section, we analyze the comparative statics of equilibrium civil service contracts.
In this framework, we assume that the legislature sets the civil service contract on the
presumption that bureaucrats behave as determined in the previous section and after
observing the parameters of the model, w,r,f,c, and δ. Since we will be interested in
the eﬀect of changes in these parameters on the equilibrium civil service contract, let
Λ = R3
+ × [0,1]2 denote the space of potential vectors of parameters, λ = (w,r,f,c,δ)
and let λ = (w,r,f,c,δ) denote an arbitrary vector of parameters. We then denote the




purposes of generality, we have not speciﬁed the bureaucrat’s preferences in any detailed
17fashion. Thus, when considering the comparative statics of the equilibrium civil service
contract, it is important to note that is quite possible that eﬀect of small deviations in
the parameters on the optimal civil service contract will be zero (e.g., ∂D∗/∂c = 0).
This is because the legislature’s goal is to implement its optimal policy, conditional on
satisfying the incentive compatibility constraint embodied in Equation 10. It is possible
for the satisfaction of Equation 10 to not “bind” on the legislature. Indeed, the only
case where the legislature’s optimal contract requires any “sensitive” satisfaction of the
bounds implied by Equation 10 is described in the third case of Proposition 4 (which is
discussed in more detail in the appendix). Another way of stating this point is to point
out that the legislature “moves ﬁrst” in the model. Thus, the analysis is not carried
out in general equilibrium: equilibrium in this context refers to perfect Bayesian Nash
equilibrium: the behavior by the bureaucrat, and the resulting implicit utility functions φ
and γ, are constructed in the previous section under the presumption that the bureaucrat
behaves optimally following the delegation of authority D and, conditional on acquiring
expertise, sets his or her most-preferred policy conditional on the state of nature, ω.

















1(λ))] = c. (11)
Any other equilibrium civil service contract does not possess interesting comparative
statics because w,r,f,c, and δ do not enter into γ.
To derive comparative statics, note that φ0 and φ1 are each nondecreasing functions.
Fact 1 For all D, φ0(D) and φ1(D) are both nondecreasing functions.
Furthermore, we impose a minor restriction on the bureaucrat’s induced preferences over
discretion when the bureaucrat is an expert and a restriction on the preferences of a
non-expert bureaucrat.
Assumption 5 Upon acquiring expertise, the bureaucrat’s expected utility from discre-
tionary authority is a strictly increasing function: φ1(D) is a strictly increasing function
for all D.
Assumption 6 A non-expert bureaucrat’s expected utility from discretionary authority
is a constant function: φ0(D) = φ0(D0) for all D,D0.
18Assumption 5 is a relatively weak assumption, it can be derived from the primitives
of the model by assuming that the cumulative distribution function of ω, G, is strictly
increasing on R.14 Assumption 6 is a stronger assumption – in words, it is equivalent to
assuming that the bureaucrat’s optimal unconstrained choice of policy is feasible for all
levels of discretion, D.
Comparative Statics When the Incentive Compatibility Constraint is Binding.
As stated above, the comparative statics of the equilibrium civil service contract are
interesting (i.e., nonconstant in the parameters of the model) only in regions where
Equation 10 holds with equality. Indeed, this must hold in an open convex set of vectors
of parameter values.
Proposition 5 Suppose that Assumptions 5 and 6 hold. Consider a vector of parameters
λ = (w,r,f,c,δ) and suppose that there exists an open convex set R ⊂ Λ containing λ








Then the following comparative statics with respect to D∗
1(λ) and D∗
2(λ) hold at λ:
1. At least one of D∗
1(λ) or D∗
2(λ) is increasing in the private sector wage, w,
2. at least one of D∗
1(λ) or D∗
2(λ) is decreasing in the civil service wage, r,
3. At least one of D∗
1(λ) or D∗
2(λ) is increasing in the probability of policy-motivated
bureaucrats, f,
4. At least one of D∗
1(λ) or D∗
2(λ) is increasing in the cost of acquiring expertise, c,
5. At least one of D∗
1(λ) or D∗
2(λ) is decreasing in the bureaucrat’s level of patience,
δ.
If condition (A) of Proposition 5 does not hold, then altering a parameter of the model
may very well not change the equilibrium contract. In particular, the legislature’s optimal
contract satisﬁes the incentive compatibility contract strictly. In this case, even though
the legislature may prefer some contract in which expertise acquisition is not incentive
14In other words, the distribution of ω possesses full support on R.
19compatible for the bureaucrat, among those contracts in which expertise acquisition does
occur in equilibrium, the best contract (for the legislature) is one in which zealots have
a strict incentive to acquire expertise.
Comparative Statics of Second-Period Discretion. In order to make the state-
ment of the comparative statics as clear as possible, we now presume that D∗
1 is constant
in the open set of parameter values of interest, R. This allows the comparative statics, as
describe in the following proposition, to be stated purely in terms of how the parameters
aﬀect the discretion oﬀered to senior (i.e., period-2 bureaucrats). The following corollary
clariﬁes
Corollary 1 Suppose that Assumptions 5 and 6 hold. Consider a vector of parameters
λ = (w,r,f,c,δ) and suppose that there exists an open set R ⊂ Λ containing λ such that











Then the following comparative statics with respect to D∗
2(λ) hold at λ:
1. D∗
2(λ) is increasing in the private sector wage, w,
2. D∗
2(λ) is decreasing in the civil service wage, r,
3. D∗
2(λ) is increasing in the probability of policy-motivated bureaucrats, f,
4. D∗
2(λ) is increasing in the cost of acquiring expertise, c,
5. D∗
2(λ) is decreasing in the bureaucrat’s level of patience, δ.
4.1 Discussion.
Below we brieﬂy discuss the conclusions of Proposition 5 and Corollary 1. Some of
the conclusions are more intuitive than others. Two of them are particularly interesting
because they are not obvious and they speak to real-world features of bureaucratic design
– the policy preferences and time horizons of potential civil servants.
20Monetary Incentives. Conclusions 1, 2, and 4 of both Proposition 5 and Corollary
1 are intuitive: the legislature must use policy “rents” to induce bureaucrats to acquire
expertise and remain in the civil service. These policy rents are increasing in discretion
so the legislature increases discretion in one or both periods when the monetary incentive
to leave the civil service (i.e., w −r) increases. Similarly, when the direct individual dis-
incentive to acquire expertise (i.e., c) increases, the legislature must increase the policy
rewards resulting from the acquisition of expertise. Proposition 5 states that these addi-
tional rewards may be granted in either the ﬁrst or second period (or both). The choice
of in which period the legislature will increase discretionary authority depends on the
exact speciﬁcation of φ and γ: the legislature will increase discretion in the period with
the lowest marginal cost.15 The fact that we must remain agnostic about the choice of in
which period the discretionary authority will increase is the price paid for the generality
of the model’s primitives.
The Probability of Zealots. Conclusion 3 of Proposition 5 and Corollary 1 is less
intuitive than the three already discussed (1, 2, and 4). When the probability of zealots
(i.e., f) increases, the legislature increases the discretion oﬀered to the bureaucrat, but
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holds in order for bureaucrats to remain in the civil service after acquiring expertise.
Thus, while increased discretion in the ﬁrst period can increase the incentive to acquire
expertise, the legislature must “eventually” use increased discretion in the second period
to induce expertise acquisition. Otherwise, by the assumption that φ1(D) − φ0(D) < c
for all c, it may be the case that the ﬁrst period type-1 bureaucrats (zealots) will not
have an incentive to acquire expertise given that other zealots will acquire expertise in
the following period.
Thus, it is possible for an increase in the probability of zealot bureaucrats to lead
to a decrease in ﬁrst-period discretion and an increase in second-period discretion. In
policy areas where potential civil servants are very likely to have policy motivations,
initial discretionary authority is set low by the legislature and then increased signiﬁcantly
15It is also theoretically possible for one of the two levels of discretion to decrease while the other
increases as the result of a change in the parameters of the model.
21during the career path. Interestingly, while this acts as a screening device or ﬁlter (along
the equilibrium path, only policy-motivated bureaucrats remain in the civil service for
more than one period), this screening is not motivated by any diﬀerence in the policies
that the two types of bureaucrats would implement (given the same information) when
in oﬃce (Assumption 2).
Conclusion 5 of Proposition 5 and Corollary 1 is also less intuitive than conclusions
1, 2, and 4. This conclusion states that as bureaucrats value future payoﬀs more highly
(i.e., δ increases), the legislature reduces discretionary authority in one or both of the
periods. The simple explanation of this comparative static is that the legislature reduces
discretion “because they can.” In eﬀect, when bureaucrats care more about future pay-
oﬀs, then existing incentives to acquire expertise become stronger. The supposition that
the equilibrium manifold is determined by the incentive compatibility constraint (condi-
tion (A)) implies that the legislature is providing suﬃcient incentives for bureaucrats to
acquire expertise (in terms of increased discretionary authority) only at a cost to itself.
Thus, when the incentive compatibility constraint stops binding – as happens when δ
increases – the legislature alters the contract so as to “take back as much discretionary
authority as it can” while still satisfying Equation 10.
This conclusion is particular interesting when the discounting of future payoﬀs by
civil servants is viewed as being derived from the possibility of being ﬁred or replaced for
reasons outside of those modeled here. In particular, if δ represents the probability of not
being ﬁred for political reasons (such as in a bureaucratic “purge”), the model predicts
that, when faced with policy areas in which the incentive compatibility constraint is
binding16 the legislature will oﬀer less discretion to the bureaucracy when job security in
the civil service is increased. Thus, suggestively, the model is consistent with bureaucrats
“doing less” after the introduction of job tenure in the civil service.
5 Discussion and Implications of the Model
This paper makes three basic points. First, many civil servants are faced with a tra-
ditional hold-up problem: they can make individually costly investments in expertise,
training, and information-gathering, but the return on these acquisitions depends sen-
sitively on the future retention and remuneration strategies of the government. This is
16Describing such areas in a precise fashion is obviously diﬃcult, but it is clear that some tasks assigned
to the bureaucracy are more electorally salient and/or more highly “politicized” than others.
22true of many professions and voluntary economic relationships, of course, but is perhaps
more relevant for government positions than for most jobs, given the unique nature of
many government jobs.17 The second point of the paper is that the government can
overcome the hold-up problem by conditioning the provision of increased discretion on
the acquisition of expertise by the bureaucrat. If such a solution exists, it comes with
an extra beneﬁt (or price): the bureaucrats who acquire expertise in such systems are
exactly those who care about policy outcomes in their own right. Neutral competence is
impossible not because “neutrality” is impossible, but because only those with a stake in
policy can be induced (by the instruments available to governments) to become experts.
Another observation from this model is that the bureaucratic expertise hold-up prob-
lem can be solved by the legislature limiting the discretion it oﬀers to the bureaucrat
early in his or her career. This solution can work even when, on the equilibrium path,
all bureaucrats acquire expertise and both bureaucrats and politicians prefer unlimited
discretion for expert bureaucrats. The reason that “artiﬁcial” constraints are placed
on discretion early in the bureaucrat’s career is simple: the bureaucrats would not ﬁnd
it incentive-compatible to acquire expertise without the conditioning of discretion on
expertise.
Furthermore, the overlapping generations feature of the model plays an important,
though subtle, role. The carrot/stick approach could be accomplished by the legislature
committing to decrease discretion after the ﬁrst period if the bureaucrat did not acquire
expertise. However, this solution does not work insofar as it does not lead to the retention
of type-1 bureaucrats. Indeed, such a strategy by the legislature may hasten the departure
of type-1 bureaucrats, as they will prefer to hand over the reins to a new bureaucrats
who will not face the reduced discretion punishment for at least one period.
5.1 Civil Service, Job Tenure, and the Development of Exper-
tise
Our model oﬀers several insights into the general design of optimal civil service contracts.
First, a bureaucrat’s incentive to acquire job-speciﬁc expertise is directly related to his
or her discount factor, δ. In practical terms, this discount factor can be thought of as
the probability of not being ﬁred randomly (or, in other words, for reasons independent
17A few examples of markets in which the government has a quasi-monopsonistic position: air traﬃc
controllers, soldiers, diplomats, ﬁremen, nuclear scientists, crypto-analysts, and secret agents.
23of whether the bureaucrat acquires expertise). Being ﬁred randomly in this setting can
be thought of as possibly occurring because of a change in the political party in power.
Eliminating (or at least reducing) the role of patronage in the distribution of bureau-
cratic appointments therefore increases δ and, hence, the bureaucrat’s incentive to acquire
job-speciﬁc expertise. This also captures an important reason for providing stable mech-
anisms for advancement and retention within the bureaucracy. Political upheaval (as in
the periodic purges of the bureaucracy in the Soviet Union and China during the mid
20th century, and continue today in some developing democracies) reduces δ and accord-
ingly inhibit the development of bureaucratic expertise. Furthermore, this inhibition is
not simply a result of bureaucrats being removed from power prior to acquiring expertise
– expertise may not be developed even during relatively long periods of stability within
the bureaucracy. The relevant variables are the beliefs of the bureaucrats themselves.
If government employees do not believe that they will be employed in their jobs for an
extended period of time, they will have little reason to acquire job-speciﬁc expertise. The
shadow of future bureaucratic instability leads to less bureaucratic expertise.
At ﬁrst glance, the role of δ in the acquisition of bureaucratic expertise is straight-
forward: why invest in being good at a job that you are likely to lose tomorrow? But
the relationship is deeper than this ﬁrst order logic. In equilibrium, the degree to which
bureaucrats become experts depends on the legislature’s response to the acquisition of
expertise. Expertise is more likely to be acquired if becoming an expert leads to more
discretionary authority and the bureaucrat in question cares about policy. In other words,
the discount factor δ determines incentives only to the extent that the future holds some-
thing of value to the bureaucrat.
This paper’s main point is that the provision of increased discretionary authority
plays this role in successful civil service design. The eﬀect of tying expertise acquisition
and discretionary authority to each other in a well-designed way is only so large as civil
servants expect not to lose to their positions for other, non-expertise-related, reasons. In
this way, the elimination of patronage, or spoils, systems for the retention of civil servants
is the ﬁrst order of business facing a social planner or legislature interested in developing
expertise within the public sector. We emphasize the retention aspects of job tenure even
more than the selection aspects of merit selection: even if a patronage system were to
select exactly the same employees chosen under merit selection, the short horizon of the
system inhibits the development of expertise, which lowers bureaucratic discretion, which
inhibits the development of expertise still further. According to our model, it is not so
24much the selection of “competent” employees, but the stable, continuing employment of
ones whose utility is especially sensitive to policy outcomes, that spurs the development
of bureaucratic expertise.
5.2 Civil Service and Self-Selection into Public Sector Employ-
ment
This research came about as a result of general discussions about bureaucratic employ-
ment. In particular, as noted earlier, employment in the civilian branches of the civil
service is generally voluntary. This fact suggests the possibility that civil servants rep-
resent a (possibly strongly) selected sample of the general electorate. In particular, it
is clear that individuals who care about aﬀecting policy will be more willing to accept
bureaucratic employment, ceteris paribus.18
Accordingly, this paper focuses on what this implies about (1) the types of individuals
that will be observed in the upper levels of bureaucratic agencies and (2) the legislature’s
ability to leverage this selection eﬀect in its attempts to design a civil service that leads
to the endogenous acquisition of job-speciﬁc expertise by civil servants.
In this respect, theory suggests that policy-motivated bureaucrats who invest in ex-
pertise early in their careers prefer staying in public service later in their careers to leaving
the civil service for outside employment. In other words, having invested in expertise,
the theory predicts that bureaucrats prefer a civil service that protects job tenure to one
that facilitates the employment of political patrons. Accordingly, the theory suggests
that tenure protection helps retain civil servants with above-average expertise.
An important reason for this is that, generally speaking, a new bureaucrat will not
have more expertise than one who is already employed and has acquired job-speciﬁc
expertise. Therefore, letting a new bureaucrat take the position will not oﬀer more
policy utility to the sitting bureaucrat than he or she can provide by remaining in the job.
Since this comparison is contingent on the diﬀerence between the level of discretionary
authority that the sitting bureaucrat will have in round 2 and the level that will be oﬀered
to a new bureaucrat, a policy-motivated bureaucrat’s incentive to acquire expertise can
be aﬀected by the design of civil service contracts. To see this in a diﬀerent light, consider
a strange design, where a new bureaucrat is given more discretionary authority than a
18By “more willing to accept a job,” we mean that such individuals may accept a lower salary, be
more amenable to relocation, and/or more persistent in attempting to acquire such employment.
25sitting bureaucrat will have in round 2. In this case, the sitting bureaucrat (even if he or
she has acquired expertise) might rather resign and let the new bureaucrat make policy.
On a related note, the theory oﬀers insights into the ﬁltering, or screening, role
of civil service design. When the legislature oﬀers the equilibrium civil-service contract,
this selection eﬀect leads to zealots (i.e., individuals motivated by public policy concerns)
being over-represented in the upper levels of the bureaucracy.
In particular, if the legislature oﬀers a high level of discretionary authority to expert
bureaucrats, and the remuneration of bureaucratic employment is low compared to pri-
vate sector wages, then, in equilibrium, zealots will tend to acquire expertise and pursue
a career in public service while individuals who are not motivated by policy concerns
(i.e., slackers) will tend to pursue their outside option in the private sector, even if they
initially accept employment in the civil service. Thus, the theory points out that the leg-
islature can use discretion as a crude way to aﬀect future payoﬀs in both type-contingent
(i.e., distinguishing slackers and zealots) and action-contingent (i.e., distinguishing those
who acquire expertise from those who do not) ways. Thus, the legislature can design con-
tracts that lead to an endogenous separation (and revelation) of types. Furthermore, the
optimal civil service contract oﬀers the highest payoﬀ to policy-motivated individuals
that invested in expertise.
6 Conclusion
Many scholars have noted that despite the eﬃciency and incentive problems created by
civil service systems of personnel management, civil service also serves valuable purposes
by improving the representativeness of the federal career workforce, its democratic pedi-
gree, and equity of employment in it. In addition, it also allows for selection of employees
with better exogenous abilities or traits. These features combined may well be enough to
overcome the management diﬃculties and perverse incentives for endogenous employee
actions that civil service systems create.
Our argument is that civil service also has other potentially compensating beneﬁts –
on fairly narrow eﬃciency grounds alone. Civil service systems of personnel management
do not simply create a trade-oﬀ between eﬃciency and other values; they create a trade-
oﬀ between speciﬁc forms of eﬃciency with subtler forms of eﬃciency, as well as with
other values. In fact, since we can infer from public sector employment patterns that
endogenous skill acquisition is important, in addition to selection of employees with
26desirable exogenous traits, the analysis of civil service’s eﬀects on endogenous employee
actions and relationship speciﬁc skills is crucial to any eﬃciency argument.
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A Equilibria when the IC Constraint is Binding
The set of expertise-discretion contracts under which the acquisition of expertise is in-
centive compatible for type-1 bureaucrats is the set of all ordered pairs of nonnegative
real numbers (¯ d1, ¯ d2) satisfying the following inequality:
1. φ1(¯ d1) − φ0(¯ d1) + δ[r − w + φ1(¯ d2) − fφ1(¯ d1) − (1 − f)φ0(¯ d1)] ≥ c.
Deﬁne the set of all such contracts by ICED(r,w,f,φ,c). The third case of equilib-
rium (as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 4) is then given by any (d,d0) ∈ ICED(r,w,f,φ,c) that
maximizes the legislature’s payoﬀ so long as
(1 + δ)γ
0( ˆ D
1) > (1 + δ(1 − f))[fγ
1(¯ d1) + (1 − f)γ
0(¯ d1)] + δfγ
1(¯ d2). (12)
28If this is the case, then the third case of the equilibrium, as discussed in Deﬁnition 4
is ( ˜ D1, ˜ D1, ˜ D2) = (¯ d1, ¯ d1, ¯ d2). If Equation 12 does not hold, then the legislature would
prefer to implement the optimal contract conditional on no agents acquiring expertise.
In those cases, the equilibrium contract is given by ( ˜ D1, ˜ D1, ˜ D2) = ( ˆ D1, ˆ D1, ˆ D1).
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